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Abstract
Long-term earnings expectations are critically important to stock price valuations.
We identify relative optimism and relative pessimism in long-term analyst forecasts
by comparing these forecasts with implied short-term earnings growth forecasts across
firms within the same industry. Stocks with relatively optimistic and relatively pes-
simistic long-term analyst forecasts have negative and positive risk-adjusted returns,
respectively. This return predictability depends critically on short-term forecasts since
relative optimism and relative pessimism originate from the slow diffusion of informa-
tion from short-term to long-term analyst forecasts. Our results indicate that market
participants have limited attention regarding the long-term earnings implications of
information.
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I Introduction
Long-term earnings expectations are crucial to stock prices. For example, according to the
Gordon growth model (1962), a price-to-dividend ratio of 20 implies that a 1% increase in
long-term dividend growth translates into a 20% return.1 The long-term earnings growth
forecasts issued by analysts are an important collection of expectations regarding future
earnings growth, hence dividend growth. Empirically, Copeland, Dolgoff, and Moel (2004)
find that revisions in these long-term forecasts exert a greater influence on stock returns
than revisions in forecasts over shorter horizons.
Given their importance to stock valuations, even small errors in long-term earnings ex-
pectations can induce large mispricings. Errors in long-term earnings expectations can arise
from their slow incorporation of information. Recently, DellaVigna and Pollet (2007) demon-
strate that market participants have limited attention regarding the long-term implications
of information. Anecdotal evidence suggests that long-term analyst forecasts, which pertain
to earnings over the next three to five years, are slow to react to information since they
are revised less frequently than annual earnings forecasts. The slow diffusion of information
from short-term to long-term analyst forecasts can result in relatively optimistic and rela-
tively pessimistic expectations of long-term earnings growth. This paper provides ex-ante
proxies for these forecast errors and documents the ability of relative optimism and relative
pessimism to predict returns. Therefore, using analyst forecasts over different horizons, we
provide direct evidence that limited attention regarding the long-term earnings implications
of information exerts a significant economic impact on stock prices.
To identify relative optimism and relative pessimism in long-term earnings growth ex-
pectations, we propose a novel yet simple “difference-in-difference” procedure that compares
long-term analyst forecasts (LTG) with implied short-term earnings growth forecasts for the
current year (ISTG). ISTG is inferred from dollar-denominated annual earnings forecasts
for the current year and realized earnings in the previous year. The ex-ante comparison
between LTG and ISTG is conducted across firms within the same industry. This industry-
1Starting with P = Dr−g where P , D, r and g denote the price, current dividend, discount rate, and
long-term dividend growth respectively, the derivative of P respect to g yields dP = Pr−gdg. It then follows
that dPP =
P
Ddg since
1
r−g is equivalent to
P
D .
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level comparison is necessary as a long-term forecast of 20% may simultaneously be optimistic
for utility companies and pessimistic for technology companies.
The slow incorporation of information into long-term analyst forecasts induces a disparity
between LTG and ISTG that captures relative optimism and relative pessimism towards
long-term earnings growth. For example, the slow incorporation of good information into
long-term forecasts results in these forecasts being pessimistic relative to short-term fore-
casts that already manifest the good information. Therefore, the low LTG / high ISTG
combination is associated with relatively pessimistic long-term forecasts following the arrival
of good information. Conversely, the opposite high LTG / low ISTG combination is associ-
ated with relatively optimistic long-term forecasts following the arrival of bad information.
Throughout our paper, optimism and pessimism refer to these relative definitions.2
Empirically, optimism leads to negative risk-adjusted returns (-27bp with a t-statistic of
-2.73), while pessimism leads to positive risk-adjusted returns (21bp with a t-statistic of 2.39)
in the first month after portfolio formation. The resulting cross-sectional risk-adjusted return
from buying low LTG / high ISTG stocks and selling high LTG / low ISTG stocks equals
48bp (t-statistic of 5.08). This risk-adjusted return persists for six months and reaches an
annualized risk-adjusted return of almost 4%. This return predictability is not attributable to
earnings momentum and is robust across different sample periods as well as different methods
for inferring ISTG. Furthermore, our double-sorted LTG / ISTG portfolios identify return
variation across stocks with similar long-term analyst forecasts. Moreover, LaPorta (1996)’s
trading strategy of buying low LTG firms and selling high LTG firms does not generate
a risk-adjusted return. Dechow and Sloan (1997) demonstrate that LTG portfolios are
closely related to market-to-book portfolios, with the Fama-French HML factor capturing a
significant portion of the return variation reported in LaPorta.
We construct a firm-specific slope variable to summarize the disparity between LTG
and ISTG within industries. This slope variable predicts returns even after controlling for
size, book-to-market, and past return characteristics as well as analyst forecast dispersion
(Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina, 2002), analyst coverage (Hou and Moskowitz, 2005), prior
2Realized earnings growth computed after portfolio formation verifies that these definitions also capture
optimism and pessimism according to their traditional ex-post definitions.
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forecast revisions and prior earnings surprises (Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok, 1996),
idiosyncratic return volatility (Ang et. al., 2006), institutional ownership (Nagel, 2005), and
revisions in analyst buy/sell recommendations (Barber et. al., 2001). In particular, common
limits to arbitrage proxies such as analyst forecast dispersion and idiosyncratic volatility can-
not explain the return predictability of our slope variable. Interestingly, while the disparity
between LTG and ISTG predicts returns, neither LTG nor ISTG have marginal return
predictability.
Revisions in long-term analyst forecasts after portfolio formation support the view that
the disparity between LTG and ISTG, hence our slope variable, originates from the slow
diffusion of information from short-term to long-term analyst forecasts. For example, con-
sistent with the slow incorporation of bad information into LTG, our short portfolio (high
LTG / low ISTG) has the most frequent and the largest post-formation downward revi-
sions in long-term forecasted earnings growth, along with the fewest upward revisions in
these forecasts. Conversely, consistent with the slow incorporation of good information into
LTG, our long portfolio (low LTG / high ISTG) has the most frequent and the largest
upward post-formation revisions in long-term forecasted earnings growth, along with the
fewest downward revisions in these forecasts. These properties are not attributable to mean-
reverting expectations of long-term earnings growth.
Post-formation revisions in long-term analyst forecasts also confirm that upward (down-
ward) revisions in ISTG during the month of portfolio formation signify the arrival of good
(bad) information regarding LTG. We directly estimate the rate at which information is
diffused from short-term to long-term analyst forecasts by regressing long-term forecast revi-
sions on prior revisions in short-term forecasted earnings growth. The return predictability
of our slope variable is limited to firms whose long-term forecasts exhibit the slowest response
to prior revisions in short-term forecasted earnings growth. We confirm this finding by mod-
ifying our trading strategy to condition on the arrival of information, which is captured by
upward and downward revisions in ISTG denoted dISTG. The modified trading strategy
produces a risk-adjusted return of almost 6% over a twelve-month holding period through
buying low LTG / high dISTG stocks and selling high LTG / low dISTG stocks. Once
again, long-term analyst forecasts within the short portfolio and long portfolio are slow to in-
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corporate information. This evidence suggests that earnings momentum is partially induced
by long-term expectations of earnings growth underreacting to information since conditioning
on dISTG parallels the sorting procedures underlying earnings momentum strategies.
DellaVigna and Pollet (2007) demonstrate that limited attention is more acute for the
long-term implications of information. Our findings contribute to a growing literature on
limited attention by applying their insight to analyst earnings forecasts over different hori-
zons. Limited attention has been used to understand different accounting disclosure policies
(Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003), the processing of market-level information at the expense of
firm-level information (Peng and Xiong, 2006), the slow reaction of investors to economic
links between customers and their respective suppliers (Cohen and Frazzini, 2008), as well as
the distinction between earnings momentum and price momentum (Hou, Peng, and Xiong,
2008). Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh (2007) and DellaVigna and Pollet (2008) find that investors
are less attentive on days with more earnings announcements and on Friday, respectively.
We also contribute to the analyst forecast literature by constructing ex-ante proxies for
relative optimism as well as relative pessimism using multiple analyst forecasts. The prior
literature has been unable to link pessimism, which is incompatible with analyst conflicts-of-
interest, with positive risk-adjusted returns. Instead, by relying on ex-post errors in short-
term forecasts, Easterwood and Nutt (1999) and Scherbina (2005) conclude that analysts are
optimistic. Although Jagannathan, Ma, and da Silva (2005) evaluate a combination of short-
term and long-term analyst forecasts, their study does not examine the disparity between
these forecasts. Furthermore, high price-to-value ratios from a residual income model, as in
Frankel and Lee (1998), can arise from low short-term and high long-term expected earnings
growth or the opposite combination of high short-term and low long-term expected earnings
growth. Our methodology differentiates between these two scenarios by assigning them a
positive slope and negative slope, respectively.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the data and
defines the variables utilized in our empirical study. The return predictability associated with
relative optimism and relative pessimism regarding long-term earnings growth is described
in Section III. Section IV documents the slow incorporation of information into long-term
analyst forecasts, while Section V concludes.
5
II Data and Definitions
Our sample of analyst earnings forecasts is obtained from the Institutional Brokers Estimate
System (IBES) Summary unadjusted file. Unadjusted IBES forecasts are not adjusted by
share splits after their issuance date.3
Starting with all unadjusted consensus earnings forecasts from 1983 through 2006, we
retain 722,034 firm-month observations for firms whose earnings in the previous year (A0t),
consensus earnings forecasts for the current fiscal year (A1t), and long-term growth forecasts
(LTGt) are available in month t. Quarterly forecasts are not studied due to their seasonality
and heightened susceptibility to smoothing by management. Mean consensus earnings fore-
casts in IBES are produced on the third Thursday of every month. Although the analysts
issuing annual forecasts may differ from those issuing long-term forecasts, we use consensus
forecasts for both maturities as they are the easiest earnings expectations for investors to
access and interpret.
The IBES dataset is merged with COMPUSTAT and CRSP. Negative book values are
eliminated from COMPUSTAT. Stock returns are obtained from CRSP after adjusting for
delistings. Shares splits are also accounted for using the split factor in CRSP. Our analysis
is conducted entirely on an earnings-per-share (EPS) basis.
The distribution of stocks with annual and long-term forecasts across the eleven IBES
industries is reported in Table 1. The number of firms in our sample increases over time
according to Panel A.4 On average, there are about 2,500 firms in our sample every month.
According to Panel B, their average size increases over time while their average book-to-
market ratio (BM) declines. Panel B also reports that long-term forecasted earnings growth
is increasing over the sample period, although its dispersion is stable. In contrast, annual
earnings forecasts (normalized by realized earnings) become less uncertain.
For emphasis, annual earnings forecasts are denominated in dollars per share over a fixed
horizon while long-term forecasts are annualized percentage growth rates. For compara-
3As detailed in Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002), the EPS after a share split is often a small number
that I/B/E/S rounds to the nearest cent. This rounding procedure can distort certain properties of dollar-
denominated analyst forecasts, such as their revisions and forecast errors.
4Analyst coverage is defined as the number of analysts issuing at least one forecast.
6
tive purposes, A1t forecasts are converted into annualized percentage growth rates denoted
ISTGt (implied short-term growth) as follows
ISTGt =
[
A1t − A0t
|A0t|
]
× 100 . (1)
Recall that A0t denotes the firm’s most recent realized annual earnings. The difference
LTGt − ISTGt is appropriate to measure the relative optimism or relative pessimism of
analysts at the portfolio-level. However, for individual firms, ISTGt has outliers that arise
from A0t being near zero. Therefore, we construct a Slope
R
t variable as the difference between
the rankings of LTGt and ISTGt. Within each industry sector, ISTGt and LTGt are sorted
into deciles from 1 to 10 in descending order. The ISTGt ranking minus the LTGt ranking
defines SlopeRi,t for firm i in month t. This intuitive non-parametric statistic is less sensitive
to ISTGt outliers and ranges from -9 to 9 for the lowest LTGt / highest ISTGt stocks (1
minus 10) to the highest LTGt / lowest ISTGt stocks (10 minus 1).
III Cross-Sectional Return Variation
To determine whether relative optimism and relative pessimism towards long-term earnings
growth can predict returns, we first examine double-sorted LTGt / ISTGt portfolios. The
SlopeRt variable is then examined in several cross-sectional regressions.
Within the eleven IBES industries, we conduct a three-by-three sequential double-sort
each month from 1983 to 2006, first according to LTGt and then ISTGt. This procedure
results in nine double-sorted portfolios that aggregate across the eleven industry sectors.
Our trading strategy buys low LTGt / high ISTGt stocks and sells high LTGt / low ISTGt
stocks. Initially, stocks with A0t < 0 are removed (approximately 10% of the sample), which
eliminates the need for the absolute value in equation (1). The removal of these firms does
not alter our conclusions and is relaxed in a subsequent robustness test. Following common
practice in the empirical asset pricing literature, we exclude stocks with share prices below
five dollars to ensure our results are not unduly influenced by bid-ask bounce.
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A. Empirical Results
The long-term forecast errors (Error) in Panel A of Table 2 are defined as LTGt minus
realized earnings growth over the subsequent three-to-five-year forecasting horizon. Thus,
optimistic long-term forecasts yield positive forecast errors while pessimistic long-term fore-
casts yield negative forecast errors. The forecast errors reported in Panel A confirm that the
high LTGt / low ISTGt and low LTGt / high ISTGt combinations capture optimism and
pessimism, respectively, according to their traditional ex-post definitions.
Table 2 also presents the equally-weighted risk-adjusted returns from conditioning on
a combination of LTGt and ISTGt within different industry sectors. These returns are
risk-adjusted using the three Fama and French (1996) factors along with Carhart (1997)’s
momentum factor. As recorded in Panel A, the risk-adjusted return of the low LTGt / high
ISTGt portfolio equals 21bp (t-statistic of 2.39), while the high LTGt / low ISTGt portfo-
lio’s risk-adjusted return equals -27bp (t-statistic of -2.73) one month after formation. Thus,
analyst optimism leads to negative risk-adjusted returns while analyst pessimism leads to
positive risk-adjusted returns. The characteristic-based procedure in Daniel, Grinblatt, Tit-
man, and Wermers (1997) confirms these risk-adjusted returns. Interestingly, while ex-post
forecast errors indicate that the magnitude of analyst optimism exceeds analyst pessimism
(in absolute value), the returns from our short portfolio and long portfolio are similar. In-
tuitively, the market appears to be better at mitigating analyst optimism than analyst
pessimism.
Panel B reports that buying low LTGt / high ISTGt stocks and selling high LTGt /
low ISTGt stocks generates a risk-adjusted return of 48bp in the first month after portfolio
formation (t-statistic of 5.08). This return predictability persists for six months, declining to
22bp (t-statistic of 2.11) by the sixth month after portfolio formation. Over this six-month
holding period, our trading strategy produces a cumulative risk-adjusted return of 190bp.
The cumulative risk-adjusted returns from our trading strategy are plotted in Figure 1 along
with a two standard deviation confidence interval.
The risk-adjusted returns from our trading strategy decrease monotonically over the six-
month holding period. The temporary nature of this return predictability is difficult to
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reconcile with risk. Lettau and Wachter (2007) and Da (2008) argue that firms with higher
cashflow durations, whose expected cashflows are concentrated in the more distant future,
have lower stock returns. The high LTGt / low ISTGt combination underlying our short
portfolio is consistent with a high cashflow duration, while the opposite low LTGt / high
ISTGt combination underlying our long portfolio is consistent with a low cashflow duration.
However, as cashflow duration is not expected to change drastically within a six-month
horizon, explaining the short-term return predictability of our trading strategy is a challenge
using cashflow duration.
The cumulative risk-adjusted returns from our trading strategy exceed the quoted bid-
ask spreads (in percentage terms) of the long portfolio and short portfolio, which are 39bp
and 46bp, respectively. Furthermore, if transaction costs were preventing investors from im-
mediately incorporating information into prices, then risk-adjusted returns and transaction
costs would decline in tandem. However, unreported transaction costs within the long port-
folio and short portfolio are stable over the six month holding period. Indeed, they increase
slightly by 1bp and 3bp over this horizon, respectively. Therefore, the decline in return
predictability is not attributable to arbitrageurs taking advantage of lower transaction costs.
In addition, Figure 2 provides preliminary evidence that analysts become less pessimistic
and less optimistic about long-term earnings growth during our trading strategy’s holding
period. To minimize the influence of outliers arising from A0t being near zero, ISTGt in
this figure is computed according to equation (1) using the aggregate A1t and aggregate
A0t of the long portfolio and short portfolio. The portfolio-level disparity between LTGt
and ISTGt narrows after the formation of both these portfolios. Section IV investigates the
post-formation dynamics of analyst forecasts in greater detail.
Finally, we find considerable post-formation return variation across stocks with similar
long-term analyst forecasts. Indeed, across the three high LTGt portfolios and across the
three low LTGt portfolios, ISTGt is responsible for identifying stocks with positive and
negative returns. Despite the importance of ISTGt, the low ISTGt portfolios have lower
subsequent returns than the high ISTGt portfolios. Thus, low ISTGt and high ISTGt
do not induce mispricings consistent with pessimism and optimism, respectively. Instead,
unreported results document that the high ISTGt and low ISTGt portfolios experience
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upward revisions and downward revisions in short-term forecasted earnings growth during
the month of portfolio formation, respectively. Although these revisions are consistent with
earnings momentum (Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok, 1996), robustness tests in the next
subsection demonstrate that the returns from our trading strategy are not subsumed by
earnings momentum.
B. Robustness Tests
This subsection confirms that the risk-adjusted returns from our trading strategy cannot
be replicated by conditioning exclusively on long-term analyst forecasts. However, despite
the importance of short-term forecasts, we demonstrate that the returns from our trading
strategy are distinct from earnings momentum.
After sorting stocks into portfolios according to their LTGt, LaPorta (1996) documents
that high LTGt stocks earn low subsequent returns. To ensure that this previous finding
cannot explain the returns from our trading strategy, our first robustness test implements
LaPorta’s trading strategy within our sample. As reported in Table 3, although low LTGt
stocks have higher unadjusted returns than high LTGt stocks, the four-factor intercept from
LaPorta’s trading strategy is insignificant (t-statistic of 1.44). Consistent with the findings
in Dechow and Sloan (1997), the Fama-French HML factor explains a significant portion
of the return from LaPorta’s strategy, with an unreported loading of 1.583 that is highly
significant (t-statistic of 22.00). Intuitively, high LTGt and low LTGt are close proxies for
growth and value characteristics, respectively.
We also demonstrate that the risk-adjusted returns from our trading strategy are not
a manifestation of earnings momentum by sorting stocks every month according to their
earnings surprises in the prior quarter (SUE) or the revisions in their annual forecasts over the
prior six months (FREV). Stocks in the top and bottom quintiles of these cross-sectional sorts
are then excluded before implementing our trading strategy on the remaining stocks. Table
3 confirms that our trading strategy’s performance is not driven by earnings momentum.
Indeed, the risk-adjusted returns from our trading strategy are higher after removing the
stocks underlying earnings momentum strategies. The next section provides further evidence
that revisions in long-term rather than short-term forecasted earnings growth are responsible
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for our trading strategy’s return predictability.
Table 3 also confirms that our trading strategy’s performance is similar across two non-
overlapping subperiods; from 1983 to 1994 and from 1995 to 2006. Figure 3 plots the
risk-adjusted returns from our trading strategy over the entire sample period and reinforces
its consistency. In unreported results, our trading strategy is robust to the enactment of the
SEC’s fair disclosure regulation (Reg FD) in late 2000 as it produces a risk-adjusted return
of 47bp (t-statistic of 2.37) during the 2001 to 2006 subperiod.
Given the importance of short-term forecasted earnings growth, ISTGt in equation (1)
is replaced with two alternatives. The first alternative relaxes the assumption that A0t is
positive in equation (1). As reported in Table 3, this assumption does not exert a large
influence on our trading strategy’s risk-adjusted return. The second alternative definition of
short-term forecasted earnings growth replaces ISTGt with the firm’s forecasted return on
book-equity
ROEt =
A1t · (# of shares)
Bt−1
, (2)
where Bt−1 denotes its book value from the prior year. Once again, this modification does
not have a material impact on our trading strategy’s performance.
C. Firm Characteristics
To complement the above robustness tests, we also examine the marginal return predictabil-
ity of our SlopeR variable after controlling for firm characteristics in the existing empirical
asset pricing literature.
Gleason and Lee (2003) find more rapid price adjustments to forecast revisions in stocks
with higher analyst coverage. Hou and Moskowitz (2005) also find that investor recognition
characteristics such as institutional ownership can explain price delays.5 However, Panel A of
Table 4 indicates that the stocks in the long portfolio and short portfolio have similar analyst
coverage (COVER) and institutional ownership (IO) as the other double-sorted portfolios.
5Nagel (2005) concludes that low institutional ownership increases the difficulty associated with short-
selling. D’Avolio (2002) reports that institutional investors are the primary lenders of securities in short-sale
transactions, while Dechow, Hutton, Meulbroek, and Sloan (2001) find that short-sellers target stocks with
high institutional ownership to minimize the cost of borrowing shares.
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Miller (1977) argues that short-sell constraints, in conjunction with differences of opin-
ion, lead to overvaluation by preventing the opinions of pessimistic investors from being
incorporated into stock prices. Using analyst forecast dispersion as a proxy for differences
of opinion, Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002) find that stocks with high forecast dis-
persion have poor subsequent risk-adjusted returns. However, Panel A of Table 4 reports
that the underperforming stocks in the short portfolio have lower forecast dispersions (DISP)
than the overperforming stocks in the long portfolio. In particular, the average A1t forecast
dispersion equals 0.198 for the long portfolio, which exceeds 0.147 for the short portfolio.6
Similarly, LTGt’s forecast dispersion of 0.327 for the long portfolio is larger than 0.234 for the
short portfolio. Besides forecast dispersion, idiosyncratic volatility (Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and
Zhang, 2006) is a common proxy for limits to arbitrage. However, the idiosyncratic volatil-
ity (IVOL) of the long portfolio and short portfolio are not unusually high. Nonetheless,
the cross-sectional regression below controls for idiosyncratic volatility as well as forecast
dispersion.
Barber, Lehavy, McNichols, and Trueman (2001) examine the consensus buy/sell recom-
mendations of analysts. These recommendations are limited to five values, with 1 denoting
a “strong buy” and 5 a “sell” recommendation. Consequently, lower numerical values for
the consensus recommendation and negative revisions represent more favorable analyst rec-
ommendations and upgrades in these recommendations, respectively. Beginning in 1994, the
REC variable in Panel A denotes the consensus buy/sell recommendation of analysts while
REC-REV signifies its revision. The results in Panel A indicate that the stocks in our long
portfolio have relatively more pessimistic consensus recommendations (REC) than those in
our short portfolio. Stocks in the long portfolio also experience recent upgrades during the
prior month while those in the short portfolio experience downgrades. However, our long
portfolio and short portfolio are not associated with extreme analyst buy/sell recommenda-
tions nor extreme revisions in these recommendations. This finding is also confirmed by a
later cross-sectional regression.
We also examine the characteristics in Jegadeesh, Kim, Krische, and Lee (2004), which in-
clude past returns over consecutive non-overlapping six-month horizons (RETP and RET2P
6The standard deviation of A1t forecasts is proportional to the standard deviation of ISTGt.
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respectively) as well as the combined twelve-month horizon (RET12) and turnover (TURN).
RET denotes the prior one-month return that is skipped during the construction of RETP,
RET2P, and RET12. These authors also consider analyst-related variables that include re-
visions in annual consensus forecasts over the past six months normalized by price (FREV)
and standardized unexpected earnings (SUE) in the prior quarter. In addition, they account
for a firm’s earnings-to-price ratio (EP), total accruals to total assets (TA), capital expendi-
tures to total assets (CAPEX), and previous sales growth (SG). Appendix A of Jegadeesh,
Kim, Krische, and Lee (2004) defines each of these characteristics in detail. Using these
characteristics, we estimate the following cross-sectional regression
ri,t+1 = β1 Slope
R
i,t + β2 BMi,t + β3 Sizei,t + β4 RET12i,t + β5 RETi,t
+β6 DISP-A1i,t + β7 DISP-LTGi,t + β8 RECi,t + β9 REC-REVi,t
+β10 FREVi,t + β11 SUEi,t + β12 LTGi,t + β13 ISTGi,t + γ ·Xi,t + i,t+1 , (3)
using monthly unadjusted returns for individual stocks. The firm and analyst characteristics
in Panel A that are not reported separately as independent variables in equation (3) are
contained in the X vector. Every independent variable is cross-sectionally demeaned and
standardized.
The significant estimates for β1 in Panel B of Table 4 indicate that our slope variable
predicts returns in every specification. In particular, consistent with its ability to capture
optimism and pessimism in long-term analyst forecasts, future returns are inversely related
to SlopeR. In contrast, the β2 coefficient for book-to-market is insignificant in several speci-
fications, but consistent with the value premium, while the β3 coefficient for size is uniformly
insignificant. The positive β4 coefficient for RET12 indicates the presence of price momen-
tum, while the negative β5 coefficient can be explained by monthly return reversals that
Avramov, Chordia, and Goyal (2006) conclude are caused by temporary liquidity shocks.
The β7 coefficient for LTGt’s dispersion is uniformly insignificant, while the β6 coefficient
for A1t’s dispersion is generally insignificant. Thus, analyst forecast dispersion cannot ex-
plain the return predictability of our slope variable. The negative β9 coefficient for REC-REV
implies that analyst downgrades (upgrades) yield negative (positive) subsequent returns, al-
though the recommendations themselves fail to predict returns since β8 is insignificant.
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The insignificant β10 coefficient indicates that past forecast revisions cannot predict re-
turns. Despite β11’s significance, Panel A indicates that earnings surprises in the prior
quarter are similar for the long portfolio and short portfolio. Consequently, as indicated by
the robustness tests in Table 3, the past forecast revisions and prior earnings surprises that
define earnings momentum cannot explain the return predictability of our slope variable.
Interestingly, neither LTGt nor ISTGt predict returns as the β12 and β13 coefficients
are both insignificant. Thus, the disparity between LTGt and ISTGt has marginal return
predictability but not the individual forecasts that comprise our slope variable.
IV Forecast Revisions and Limited Attention
This section documents that post-formation revisions in long-term analyst forecasts are cru-
cial to understanding the risk-adjusted returns from our trading strategy as well as the
return predictability of our slope variable. We also examine revisions in short-term analyst
forecasts. In unreported results, the long portfolio experiences an average upward revision
in ISTGt of 0.88%, while the short portfolio experiences an average downward revision in
ISTGt of -1.42%. These revisions signify the arrival of good and bad information in month
t, respectively. However, post-formation revisions in short-term forecasted earnings growth
cannot explain the risk-adjusted returns from our trading strategy as they exhibit no dis-
cernible cross-sectional patterns across the double-sorted portfolios.
In contrast, there is strong evidence that long-term earnings growth forecasts for stocks
within our long portfolio and short portfolio are slow to incorporate information. Revisions
in long-term forecasted earnings growth during the month of portfolio formation as well as
cumulative post-formation revisions are reported in Table 5.7 Six months after the long port-
folio and short portfolio are formed, they have experienced cumulative upward and downward
revisions in long-term forecasted earnings growth of 0.44% and -1.60%, respectively. These
post-formation revisions are the largest upward and largest downward revisions across the
nine double-sorted portfolios, respectively, and consistent with the slow incorporation of
good and bad information into long-term analyst forecasts. These revisions do not simply
7The cumulative post-formation revisions are based on the prevailing LTGt forecasts in month t.
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reflect mean-reversion in long-term forecasted earnings growth. Indeed, after six months,
the difference between the cumulative revisions in long-term forecasted earnings growth for
the short portfolio and the high LTGt / high ISTGt portfolio, -1.60% versus -0.75%, is
significant (t-statistic of -9.04) despite both portfolios having high LTGt at the time of their
formation. The comparable difference between our long portfolio and the low LTGt / low
ISTGt portfolio, 0.44% versus 0.19%, is also significant (t-statistic of 6.14) after six months
despite both portfolios having low LTGt at the time of their formation.
Consistent with analysts underreacting to the long-term implications of good information,
the long portfolio has the highest percentage of upward post-formation revisions and the low-
est percentage of downward post-formation revisions, 28.52% versus 17.64%, respectively. In
contrast, consistent with analysts underreacting to the long-term implications of bad infor-
mation, the short portfolio has the highest percentage of downward post-formation revisions
and the lowest percentage of upward post-formation revisions, 38.84% versus 12.62%, re-
spectively.8
Finally, for the long portfolio and short portfolio, post-formation revisions in long-term
forecasted earnings growth are of the same sign as ISTGt revisions during the month of
portfolio formation. This pattern confirms that upward revisions in ISTGt signify the ar-
rival of good information regarding long-term as well as short-term earnings growth while
downward revisions in ISTGt signify the arrival of bad information regarding long-term
as well as short-term earnings growth. The next subsection estimates the speed at which
information is diffused from short-term to long-term analyst forecasts.
A. Delayed Response Measure
Our previous analysis indicates that the slow incorporation of information into long-term
analyst forecasts is responsible for our slope variable’s return predictability. We verify this
conclusion by estimating a firm-level proxy for the speed at which information diffuses from
short-term to long-term forecasts. This proxy is estimated as the γ1 coefficient in the fol-
8The percentage of upward revisions and downward revisions does not sum to 100% since many revisions
reiterate previous forecasts.
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lowing regression
RevLTGt+6,t = γ0 + γ1 RevISTGt,t−1 + γ2 LTGt + γ3 RET12t + t , (4)
where RevLTG and RevISTG denote revisions in long-term and short-term forecasted earn-
ings growth. Once again, RET12 refers to returns over the past twelve months (after a
one-month delay). The γ1 coefficient captures the sensitivity of future revisions in long-term
forecasted earnings growth over a six-month horizon to revisions in short-term forecasted
earnings growth during the prior month, while γ2 captures mean-reversion in long-term
earnings growth forecasts. For emphasis, equation (4) is estimated for individual firms, with
the i subscript omitted for notational simplicity.
The firm-level time series regression in equation (4) is performed over rolling three-year
windows for stocks that have a minimum of two years of available data. Every month, stocks
are sorted into terciles according to their γ1 coefficient. The average γ1 coefficient equals
0.0032, while the median is also positive.
Within each γ1 tercile, we estimate the following cross-sectional regression
rt+1 = β1 Slope
R
t + β2 BMt + β3 Sizet + β4 RET12t + β5 RETt + t+1 (5)
which is a simplified version of equation (3).9 This regression conditions on γ1 coefficients
that are estimated in month t.
If the slow diffusion of information from short-term to long-term analyst forecasts is
responsible for the return predictability of SlopeR, then firms with a positive γ1 coefficient are
expected to have a negative β1 coefficient. Consistent with this hypothesis, Table 6 indicates
that the return predictability of our slope variable is concentrated in firms with the highest γ1
coefficients. Indeed, the β1 coefficient of -0.0017 for Slope
R in the high γ1 subset is significant
(t-statistic of -3.05). Conversely, the smaller -0.0005 β1 coefficient for Slope
R in the low γ1
subset is insignificant. As a consequence, the slow diffusion of information from short-term to
long-term forecasts appears to be the origin of our slope variable’s return predictability. To
verify this finding, the next subsection examines a modified trading strategy that conditions
on the arrival of information.
9Our trading strategy is not implemented within each tercile since too few firms are available within these
terciles to conduct industry-level comparisons of forecasted earnings growth.
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B. Modified Trading Strategy
A modified trading strategy that conditions on revisions in ISTGt, denoted dISTGt, enables
us to further examine the return predictability that surrounds the slow incorporation of in-
formation into long-term analyst forecasts. This modification focuses on double-sorted LTGt
/ dISTGt portfolios. As documented earlier, dISTGt proxies for the arrival of information
that is relevant to short-term as well as long-term earnings growth. While our original LTGt
/ ISTGt trading strategy focused on relative optimism and relative pessimism in long-term
forecasts, its modification focuses on the arrival of information.
According to Panel A of Table 7, the high LTGt / low dISTGt portfolio earns a neg-
ative risk-adjusted return while the low LTGt / high dISTGt portfolio earns a positive
risk-adjusted return. These risk-adjusted returns are consistent with investors underesti-
mating the long-term implications of bad information and good information, respectively.
For brevity, we report the cross-sectional risk-adjusted returns from the modified trading
strategy for one, three, six, nine, and twelve months after portfolio formation in Panel B.
Under the standard four-factor model, the risk-adjusted returns from the LTGt / dISTGt
trading strategy persist for one year and reach a cumulative risk-adjusted return of almost
6% over this horizon. In unreported results, the risk-adjusted returns from the LTGt /
dISTGt trading strategy persist for 13 months.
10
Panel C indicates that six months after their formation, the long portfolio contains stocks
with the largest cumulative upward revisions while the short portfolio contains stocks with
the largest downward cumulative revisions. Furthermore, the long portfolio has the highest
percentage of upward post-formation revisions and lowest percentage of downward post-
formation revisions in long-term forecasted earnings growth. In contrast, the short portfolio
has the lowest percentage of upward post-formation revisions and highest percentage of
downward post-formation revisions in long-term forecasted earnings growth. These post-
formation revisions in long-term forecasted earnings growth are consistent with an underre-
action to good and bad information, respectively.
10Risk-adjusted returns computed using the characteristic-based approach of Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman,
and Wermers (1997) persist for eight months after portfolio formation, and reach a cumulative risk-adjusted
return of 315bp over this horizon.
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Conditioning on dISTGt is similar to the sorting mechanism underlying the earnings mo-
mentum strategies in Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1996). Therefore, Table 7 suggests
that a portion of earnings momentum is attributable to an underreaction in long-term expec-
tations of earnings growth. However, the high dISTGt portfolios have positive risk-adjusted
returns, which is consistent with a general underreaction to good information. Thus, earn-
ings momentum cannot be entirely explained by the slow incorporation of information into
long-term analyst forecasts.
C. Discussion and Interpretation
The accuracy of annual earnings forecasts is easier to monitor than the accuracy of long-
term forecasts, which implies that short-term forecast accuracy is more important to analyst
careers. Consequently, analysts have an incentive to revise their annual earnings forecasts
before revising their long-term forecasts. Indeed, on average, firm-level revisions in long-
term consensus forecasts occur at five month intervals in our sample while revisions in annual
forecasts occur at two month intervals. Moreover, the average duration of an analyst’s career
is four years according to Hong and Kubik (2003). Thus, analysts are less accountable for
their long-term forecasts.
However, analyst incentives cannot explain the underreaction exhibited by investors. In
contrast, the theory of limited attention in DellaVigna and Pollet (2007) applies to investor
expectations, hence returns, as well as analyst forecasts. Less frequent long-term forecast
revisions by analysts are also compatible with their theory of limited attention. Thus, limited
attention provides a more complete description of our results than analyst incentives.
The overconfident investor in Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) overweights
private information at the expense of public information. Overconfidence requires a dispar-
ity between analyst forecasts (public information) and the private information of investors.
However, our results suggest that investors are overly reliant on long-term analyst forecasts.
Moreover, overconfidence posits an overreaction to private information, while the return
predictability we document is more consistent with the slow reaction of long-term analyst
forecasts to information that was previously incorporated into their short-term forecasts. In-
deed, our empirical results are more consistent with the slow diffusion of public information
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into long-term forecasts than the slow diffusion of private information hypothesized by Hong
and Stein (1999).
In their single-asset model, Brav and Heaton (2002) demonstrate that the influence of
behavioral biases on stock returns is difficult to disentangle from Bayesian learning. Learning
allows market participants to initially overestimate or underestimate the long-term earnings
growth of individual firms. Thus, errors in the initial expectations of long-term earnings
growth should be diversifiable. However, our evidence also indicates that analysts con-
sistently underestimate the long-term earnings implications of information. Indeed, while
greater uncertainty regarding the long-term earnings implications of information can cause
investors to assign more weight to their priors, return predictability at the portfolio-level
implies that these priors systematically underestimate the long-term earnings implications of
such information. Thus, our findings are incompatible with unbiased investor expectations
of long-term earnings growth.
V Conclusions
Long-term earnings expectations are crucial to stock price valuations. This paper provides
a novel procedure for identifying relative pessimism and relative optimism in long-term
analyst forecasts using a combination of short-term and long-term analyst forecasts. Both
these errors in long-term expectations predict returns and appear to originate from the slow
incorporation of information into long-term analyst forecasts.
Intuitively, the slow speed at which information diffuses from short-term to long-term
analyst forecasts creates disparities between these forecasts that capture relative pessimism
as well as relative optimism towards long-term earnings growth. For example, the slow incor-
poration of good information into long-term forecasts causes these forecasts to be pessimistic
relative to short-term forecasts that already reflect the good information. Consequently, a
combination of low long-term and high short-term forecasted earnings growth is associated
with relatively pessimistic long-term forecasts that slowly incorporate good information.
Conversely, the opposite combination of high long-term and low short-term forecasted earn-
ings growth is associated with relatively optimistic long-term analyst forecasts that slowly
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incorporate bad information. Double-sorted portfolios, as well as a firm-specific slope variable
defined as long-term minus short-term forecasted earnings growth, provide ex-ante proxies for
relative pessimism and relative optimism that enable us to evaluate the return predictability
of these errors in long-term expectations.
Analyst pessimism and analyst optimism lead to positive and negative risk-adjusted
returns respectively. This return predictability persists for six months. Our slope variable
also predicts returns after controlling for a multitude of firm characteristics such as analyst
forecast dispersion, idiosyncratic volatility, institutional ownership, and analyst coverage,
as well as prior earnings surprises and prior forecast revisions in the earnings momentum
literature. Moreover, while our slope variable predicts returns, neither of the individual
forecasts that comprise this disparity has marginal return predictability.
Conditioning on short-term forecasted earnings growth is crucial to identifying errors in
long-term analyst forecasts that predict returns. Indeed, conditioning on long-term analyst
forecasts alone, as in LaPorta (1996), does not produce a risk-adjusted return. Despite the
importance of short-term forecasts, the return predictability arising from relative optimism
and relative pessimism is not attributable to earnings momentum.
Post-formation revisions in long-term analyst forecasts explain the return-adjusted re-
turns from our trading strategy as well as our slope variable’s return predictability. In
particular, the portfolio with high long-term and low short-term forecasted earnings growth,
which is associated with relative optimism due to the slow incorporation of bad information
into long-term analyst forecasts, has the largest and most frequent downward post-formation
revisions in long-term forecasted earnings growth. Conversely, the opposite combination of
low long-term and high short-term forecasted earnings growth, which is associated with
relative pessimism and the slow incorporation of good information into long-term analyst
forecasts, has the largest and most frequent upward post-formation revisions in long-term
forecasted earnings growth. Additional tests confirm that the return predictability underly-
ing our trading strategy and slope variable originate from the slow diffusion of information
from short-term to long-term analyst forecasts. The limited attention towards information
with long-term implications hypothesized by DellaVigna and Pollet (2007) offers an explana-
tion for this return predictability as well as the underreaction exhibited by long-term analyst
20
forecasts.
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Table 6: This table reports on the return implications of the firm-level γ1 estimates from equation (4). These estimates
measure the sensitivity of cumulative revisions in a firm’s long-term forecasted earnings growth over a six-month horizon
(RevLTG) to revisions in its short-term forecasted earnings growth during the prior month (RevISTG), RevLTGt+6,t = γ0 +
γ1 RevISTGt,t−1 + γ2 LTGt + γ3 RET12t + t. This firm-level regression is performed monthly over rolling three-year windows
for stocks that have a minimum of two years data to obtain a monthly cross-section of γ1 estimates. Every month, stocks are
then sorted into terciles according to their γ1 estimate. A regression of monthly stock returns on our SlopeR variable, as in
equation (5), is then conducted for stocks with high γ1 estimates and low γ1 estimates where these thresholds are defined as
the 33rd and 66th percentiles, respectively. Within the low tercile and high tercile, the time series averages of the regression
coefficients for rt+1 = β1 Slope
R
t + β2 BMt + β3 Sizet + β4 RET12t + β5 RETt + t+1 are reported. BM represents a firm’s
book-to-market ratio while Size refers to its market capitalization. RET12 denotes past returns over the prior twelve months
after omitting the most recent month (RET). The t-statistics (in italics) below each regression coefficient are Newey-West
adjusted with 12 lags.
γ1 N SlopeR BM Size RET12 RET Avg. R2
High 382 -0.0017 0.0006 -0.0007 0.0019 -0.0033 0.066
-3.05 0.65 -0.76 1.92 -4.84
Low 382 -0.0005 0.0010 -0.0005 0.0024 -0.0044 0.066
-0.98 1.09 -0.67 2.47 -6.28
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Cumulative Risk-Adjusted Return of Trading Strategy
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Figure 1: This figure plots the cumulative risk-adjusted returns from our trading strategy
that buys low LTGt / high ISTGt stocks and sells high LTGt/ low ISTGt stocks. Im-
plied short-term forecasted earnings growth, ISTGt, is computed according to equation (1)
using annual consensus earnings forecasts and realized earnings, while LTGt denotes long-
term analyst forecasts for earnings growth. A holding period from one to six months after
portfolio formation is considered. The cumulative risk-adjusted returns over this six-month
horizon, which equals 190bp, are graphed along with a confidence interval defined by (plus
and minus) two standard deviations.
Slope of Earnings Term Structure 
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Figure 2: This figure plots the difference, LTGt− ISTGt, for the long portfolio and short
portfolio underlying our trading strategy, starting in the month of portfolio formation until
six months afterwards. The long portfolio contains low LTGt / high ISTGt stocks while
the short portfolio contains high LTGt / low ISTGt stocks. Implied short-term forecasted
earnings growth, ISTGt, is computed at the portfolio-level according to equation (1) using
a portfolio’s aggregate annual earnings forecast and its aggregate realized earnings. LTGt
denotes a portfolio’s aggregate long-term analyst forecast for earnings growth.
Time Series of Trading Strategy's Risk-Adjusted Return
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Figure 3: This figure plots the risk-adjusted returns from our trading strategy, which
buys stocks with low LTGt / high ISTGt and sells stocks with high LTGt/ low ISTGt
over the 1983 to 2006 period. Implied short-term forecasted earnings growth, ISTGt, is
computed according to equation (1) using annual earnings forecasts and realized earnings,
while LTGt denotes long-term analyst forecasts for earnings growth. The risk-adjusted
returns are computed in the first month after the long portfolio and short portfolio are
formed.
